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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Stephen D. Newman appeals from his conviction for attempted rape. 
Newman challenges the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
A grand jury indicted Newman for attempted rape. (R., pp. 17-18.) 
Newman filed a motion to suppress all evidence "seized and obtained as a result 
of his warrantless arrest." (R., pp. 39-41.) At the hearing on the motion, 
Newman argued that because the United States Supreme Court was at the time 
reviewing the issue of the validity and scope of a search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest once a suspect was secured without access to such vehicle, see Arizona 
v. Gant, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the rationale for such search was 
called into question and necessitated the suppression of the evidence seized 
from Newman's car.' (~r., '  p. 84, L. 1 - p. 87 L. 3.) The district court made the 
following findings after hearing testimony on the motion to suppress: 
Officer Bammert testified that he made contact with Gretchen H. 
and her husband after dark in an Albertson's parking lot, near 
McDevitt Park. These individuals showed the officers an e-mail 
which indicted that there would be a free lpod in the port-a-potty at 
the park. Officer Bammert saw that there were two port-a-potties in 
' Newman argued two bases for suppression: the state of tile law as it dealt with 
vehicle searches incident to arrest, and Newman's claim that his arrest was 
invalid due to a vague city ordinance. (Tr. p. 76, L. 1 - p. 89, L. 3.) The court 
ultimately concluded that the ordinance was not void for vagueness (R., pp. 58- 
65), and Newman does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
TWO transcripts have been prepared for this appeal: one of the jury trial and 
another consisting of motion hearings. The latter is the only transcript cited to in 
this brief and will be referred to as "Tr.". 
the park and he told Gretchen that he would get it for her, if it were 
there. A search of the first one revealed no lpod. Officer Bammert 
then went to the second one, where the defendant was parked 
nearby, sitting in his vehicle. When Officer Bammert approached 
the vehicle on its passenger side, he could not initially tell that 
anyone was inside, because it was dark and the vehicle's windows 
were tinted. There were two other officers also present at the time. 
Officer Bammert knocked on the vehicle window and the defendant, 
wearing a black stocking cap, rolled it down saying, in response to 
questioning, that he had been working on his computer for about an 
hour an a half. Officer Bammert asked him to exit his vehicle and, 
while the defendant was doing so, Officer Bammert saw the 
defendant putting something back into the vehicle, between the 
seats. Officer Bammert asked the defendant what he put in the 
vehicle and the defendant did not answer. Officer Bammert looked 
into the vehicle and saw that it was a pellet gun, which looked like a 
real gun. Officer Bammert did not initially know that it was not a 
real gun. Officer Bammert also observed a computer and a pair of 
ski gloves, in the vehicle. There was a bread knife with an eight to 
ten inch blade, later discovered underneath the gloves. The officer 
noted that it was hot that night. Officer Bammert arrested the 
defendant for being in the park after dark (and for carrying a 
concealed weapon). 
. . . While the defendant was exiting the vehicle to comply 
[with Officer Bammert's directive that he do so], he was observed 
putting something back in the vehicle. After the defendant was 
placed in handcuffs and was sitting on the curb, pursuant to his 
arrest, all three officers present searched the defendant's vehicle. 
. . . The officer said that after he found the pellet gun, the 
defendant informed him that it was not a real gun, but a pellet gun. 
There was some disagreement between the officers as to whether 
the defendant told them about the gun, after he was arrested but 
before the search or if it was seen through the window before the 
arrest and the search of the vehicle. Regardless of the minor 
differences, it is clear that for legal purposes, the arrest and 
discovery of the weapon were for all practical purposes 
contemporaneous. 
(R., pp. 55-57 (footnote and citations omitted).) The district court held that under 
the state of the law in effect at the time of the hearing, the search of Newman's 
car "incident to his arrest was lawful." (R., p. 66.) The district court denied 
Newman's suppression motion, finding a proper search of the passenger 
compartment of the car incident to arrest. (R., pp. 65-68). 
The case proceeded to jury trial, where Newman was found guilty of 
attempted rape. (R., p. 145.) The district court sentenced Newman to a unified 
sentence of 15 years with the first seven and a half years fixed and the remaining 
seven and a half years indeterminate. (R., pp. 167-170.) Newman filed a timely 
appeal. (R., pp. 178-181 .) 
ISSUE 
Newman states the issue on appeal as: 
Under the Supreme Court's Gant decision, was the search 
incident to arrest in this case unconstitutional; should the 
evidentiary fruits of that search have been suppressed; and was the 
introduction of that evidence at trial prejudicial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 11 (capitalization altered).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Officers searched the passenger compartment of Newman's car incident 
to Newman's arrest. Has Newman failed to show either that the search was 
improper or that he was entitled to exclusion of evidence found pursuant to the 
search? 
ARGUMENT 
The Search Of Newman's Vehicle Did Not Violate His Riclhts Aqainst 
Unreasonable Searches 
A. Introduction 
The district court applied the m3 rule, as adopted by the ldaho courts 
and discussed in State v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133, 135-138 (2005), 
and found that the search of the passenger compartment of Newman's car was a 
proper search incident to arrest. (R., pp. 65-66.) The m line of cases has 
subsequently been partially overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). On appeal, Newman 
asserts that the evidence against him should be suppressed because the search 
of the passenger compartment of his car did not comply with the requirements of 
m. (Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21 .) Newman's argument fails. Even if the 
search of Newman's vehicle was in contravention of the m holding, the 
exclusionary rule does not apply because the officer acted in good faith reliance 
on law as it existed at the time of the search. Alternatively, suppression is not 
required because the district court's findings support alternative theories upon 
which to affirm. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
5 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. If The Search Of Newman's Vehicle Deemed Im~roper Under Gant, 
Newman Is Not Entitled To Suppression Under The Fourth Amendment 
I In Arizona v. Gant, - U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the Supreme 
Court of the United States rejected the "bright line" rule of New York v. Belton, 
453 U.S. 454 (1981), and adopted the following legal standard for the search of a 
I passenger compartment incident to arrest: "Police may search a vehicle incident 
I to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
I 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe 
I 
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Gant, U.S. -, 129 
I S Ct. at 1723. Assuming that the search of Newman's car was impr~per ,~  he is 
still not entitled to suppression of evidence under the Fourth Amendment. 
I 
I Where, as here, the conduct of the officer was objectively reasonable a 
I 
I 
defendant is not entitled to suppression even if the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment. 
It is undisputed that officers searched Newman's car without a warrant. Further, 
at the time the officers began the search, Newman had been placed under arrest 
for the violation of a city park ordinance. (Tr., p. 18, L. 23 - p. 19, L. 10; p. 31, L. 
22 - p. 32, L. 11 .) The officers were not looking for evidence of that offense in 
his vehicle. Thus, under m, the only permissible justification the officers may 
have had for searching Newman's car incident to his arrest would have been if 
Newman was not sufficiently secured at the time of the search to prevent him 
from reaching into the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Because the law 
regarding search incident to arrest pre-(jant clearly allowed the search of 
Newman's vehicle regardless of his secured status, neither the prosecution nor 
the defense presented any evidence to inform the analysis on this particular point 
at the suppression hearing. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). the United States Supreme 
Court addressed the question of whether suppression of evidence was 
appropriate where the police had relied upon a facially valid warrant. The Court 
first noted that its precedents did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy 
for all Fourth Amendment violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-06 (citing Stone v. 
w, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the 
individual, but is rather a judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 
(1 974)). 
The Court further stated that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts 
"substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial 
system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced 
sentences. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907. When applied to actions of law enforcement 
taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the 
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the 
criminal justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the 
administration of justice. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule 
should be applied only "'where its remedial objectives are thought most 
efficaciously served."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 910 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 
348). 
Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of 
discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to 
deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity." Leon, 468 U.S. at 918- 
19. Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting Michiaan 
v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)). Once an officer has obtained a warrant, 
there is nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore, 
"[plenalizing the officer for the magistrate's error, rather than his own, cannot 
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." Leon, 
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits 
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on 
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of 
exclusion." Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
Exclusion of evidence from the execution of an invalid search warrant is 
only appropriate where the magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew 
was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing 
magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role;" where probable cause was so 
lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable;" and 
where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not 
reasonably presume that it was valid. &, 468 U.S. at 922-23. 
Leon's "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court in other 
contexts as well. In Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested 
on an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was 
later learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but 
the court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in 
computer records. Id. at 4-5. Concluding that the officer's conduct was 
reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be 
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded 
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 14-16. 
Recently the Court decided Herrina v. United States, - U.S. -, 129 
S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an 
arrest warrant that appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement 
in a different county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the 
warrant had been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal 
possession of a controlled substance and a firearm was not required because the 
police conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly 
negligent conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence." Id. at -, 129 S.Ct. 
at 702. Suppression is not called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes 
are the result of simple negligence rather than systemic errors or reckless 
disregard of constitutional requirements. Id. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 704. 
In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987). a police officer inspected 
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant 
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people 
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as 
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search. Id. at 344. Applying 
the reasoning of Leon, the Court concluded that the error in that case was the 
Illinois Legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there 
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression. Id. at 349-53. The 
Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable; 
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply. fd. at 356-60. 
The analysis of these cases applies in this one. Officer Bammert acted 
reasonably under the law as it existed at the time. The district court, in 
determining that it must follow precedent until such precedent was overturned, 
held that "the search of the defendant's vehicle incident to his arrest was lawful." 
(R., p. 66.) The legality of search incident to arrest was well established at that 
time: 
Under the rule adopted by this Court, the police know what they 
can do after they have made a lawful arrest. The public knows the 
extent of protection afforded from a search while utilizing the 
automobile. The automobile is not a haven for weapons, 
contraband or evidence of criminal activity once the threshold 
re~uirement that there be a lawful arrest has been reached. 
State v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 234, 127 P.3d 133, 137 (2005). It was not 
unreasonable for Officer Bammert to fail to anticipate that that the Supreme 
Court of the United States would, almost two years later, alter the applicable 
legal standards. 
Because Officer Bammert's conduct was reasonable and in no way the 
product of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or ... recurring or 
systemic negligence," m, - U.S. at - , 129 S.Ct. at 702, the 
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply. 
D. The Exclusionary Rule Should Not Applv In This Case Under The ldaho 
Constitution 
The search in this case was legal under the ldaho Constitution as it has 
been so far interpreted by its courts. State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 649, 651, 
962 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1998); State v. Heer, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 1154, 
1155 (Ct. App. 1990). No ldaho case has, as of the writing of this brief, adopted 
Gant as the proper interpretation of the ldaho's constitutional search and seizure 
provisions. 
If this Court should, in this case or another pending case, adopt the m t  
analysis as controlling under ldaho's constitution, and even if the search of 
Newman's car was unreasonable under Gant, application of ldaho's exclusionary 
rule would be unreasonable. The state requests this Court to either adopt the 
exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment as applicable under ldaho's 
constitution or, in the alternative, to hold that exclusion would be improper under 
Idaho's standard on the facts of this case. 
1. The Exclusionarv Rule Under The ldaho Constitution Should Be 
Co-Extensive With The Exclusionarv Rule Of The Fourth 
Amendment 
The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was rejected by a 
two justice plurality5 of the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho 
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), overruling State v. Prestwich, 116 ldaho 959, 783 
P.2d 298 (1989). The state respectfully submits that Guzrnan should be 
overruled, and the law as set forth in Prestwich reinstated. Precedence of the 
ldaho Supreme Court can, and should, be overruled if it is manifestly wrong, has 
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate 
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice. Houqhland 
In State v. Josephson, 123 ldaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (1993). a unanimous 
court applied Guzman, holding that it applied retroactively, to reverse a district 
court's denial of suppression. 
Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). The 
Guzman opinion should be overruled because a review of its reasoning shows it 
to be manifestly wrong, and following persuasive reasoning of the United States 
Supreme Court would result in clarity and uniformity of the law and better meet 
the objectives of the exclusionary rule. 
Writing for the court, Justice Bistline reasoned that ldaho had adopted the 
exclusionary rule at a time when the United States Supreme Court had not made 
the exclusionary rule mandatory upon the states, and that the exclusionary rule 
ldaho adopted was more comprehensive than the federal rule. Because Idaho's 
exclusionary rule was designed to protect broader interests than preventing 
police overreaching, the purpose the Guzman plurality felt was the sole 
underpinning of the exclusionary rule in Leon, the Court reasoned that Idaho's 
history of application of the exclusionary rule was inconsistent with allowing a 
good faith exception. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 992-93, 842 P.2d at 671-72. 
The reasoning of the Guzman plurality is flawed for two reasons. First, a 
review of the ldaho cases upon which Justice Bistline relied does not support his 
conclusions. To the contrary, those cases clearly show that Idaho's exclusionary 
rule is co-extensive with the exclusionary rule as adopted and applied by the 
United States Supreme Court. Second, even assuming that the ldaho 
exclusionary rule serves the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable 
searches and seizures, deterring Fourth Amendment violation and protecting 
judicial integrity, the good faith exception as articulated in Leon is consistent with 
those purposes. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality does not 
support its analysis or results. For example, the court first relied upon State v. 
Arrequi, 44 ldaho 43: 254 P. 788 (1927), the case adopting the exclusionary rule 
for ldaho. However, the court in Arrequi specifically relied upon United States 
Supreme Court authority in adopting the exclusionary rule. Arrequi, 44 ldaho at 
-, 254 P. at 791. Furthermore, the court, quoting a passage from an 
Oklahoma court that it "would not attempt to improve," went so far as to say that 
the "'guarantees of immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures"' in the 
federal and state constitutions "'are practically the same,"' and therefore "'it 
follows without argument that the rule of evidence in the state courts, where like 
facts and principles of law are involved, should conform to that settled by the 
court having supreme prestige and authority."' - Id. (emphasis added) 
(quoting Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Ok. Cr. App. 1923)). It is thus clear that 
the ldaho Supreme Court did riot adopt an exclusionary rule for the ldaho 
Constitution different from that pronounced by the United States Supreme Court 
for the Fourth Amendment. 
Nor are the other cases relied upon in Guzman indicative that the ldaho 
Supreme Court had ever adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Rauch, 
99 ldaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), the court suppressed for failure to comply 
with the knock and announce statutes, relying heavily upon the "landmark case" 
of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). The only mention of the ldaho 
Constitution occurs in the quote of a dissenting opinion. m, 99 ldaho at 593, 
586 P.2d at 678 (quoting State v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 527, 174 P. 124, 129 
(1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting)). There is nothing in the opinion that would 
suggest that the exclusionary rule in ldaho is broader than its federal counterpart. 
Likewise, in State v. LePaae, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), cert. 
den. 454 U.S. 1057 (1982), the court determined LePage's right to counsel had 
been violated under both the federal and state constitutions. The part of the 
opinion relied upon by the Guzman court for the proposition that judicial integrity 
is a factor in exclusion is actually a quote from two United States Supreme Court 
cases. In response to a claim that the issue had not been preserved by proper 
objection below, the court stated: 
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the 
judiciary does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a 
manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both 
state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice. 
While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly 
to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the 
courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the 
part of law enforcement agencies. nCourts . . . cannot and will 
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of 
citizens by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such 
invasions." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20 
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While "the imperative of judicial integrity" 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4 
L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may not be the primary reason for refusing to 
allow the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it 
certainly requires us to exercise our discretion to review alleged 
errors that affect substantial rights and are "plain" in the sense that 
it is evident that a mistake has occurred. Accordingly, we turn to an 
examination of the merits of LePage's claim. 
LePaqe, 102 ldaho at 391-92,630 P.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the part of the LePaqe opinion relied upon for the claim that Idaho's 
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal one, and therefore cannot recognize 
a good faith exception, actually states quite the opposite. The court specifically 
referenced both federal and state rights, drawing no distinction between them. 
The court also stated that the primary purpose of the rule is deterring police 
conduct, and the secondary reasoning is that the courts cannot be made a party 
to "certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies." This purpose is 
entirely consistent with a good faith exception as articulated in Leon. Finally, the 
court does not rely upon ldaho authority for this proposition, but rather authority 
of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, nothing in the LePaqe decision 
indicates that the ldaho Supreme Court was adopting or articulating any rule 
different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with the Leon good faith 
exception. 
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality shows that 
there is nothing in those cases indicating that ldaho's exclusionary rule is any 
different than its federal counterpart. To the contrary, those cases show that the 
ldaho Supreme Court has consistently looked to the decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court in both adopting and defining the exclusionary rule in 
ldaho law. Because Guzman misinterpreted and misapplied ldaho law, it should 
be overruled, and the ldaho exclusionary rule be interpreted as coextensive with 
exclusion as required by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
The second flaw of Guzman is its contention that the Leon good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated 
to police deterrence. The plurality contended that Idaho's exclusionary rule 
served the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and 
seizures, deterring police misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant 
application process, preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing 
consideration of the evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 
Idaho at 993, 842 P.2d at 672. The United States Supreme Court persuasively 
addressed these concerns, explaining why they do not require suppression of 
evidence where the police have acted objectively reasonably. 
The Leon Court did not, as implied in Guzman, reject remedial or other 
concerns in the exclusionary rule. Leon, 468 U.S. at 905-13. The Court started 
its analysis of exclusion as a remedy by specifically noting that exclusion is a 
court-created - not a constitutionally mandated - remedy. Leon, 468 U.S. at 
905-06. This remedy is sensitive to the costs it exacts, and is to be restricted to 
those areas "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously 
sewed."' Leon, 468 U.S. at 906-08 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348). 
Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, because of those costs, tends 
to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the administration of justice. 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 908. Thus, the Court had previously found limitations on the 
exclusionary rule related to federal habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; civil 
trials; where a particular defendant had no standing; in using the evidence for 
rebuttal; and refusing to adopt a "but for" standard for suppression. Leon; 468 
U.S. at 909-1 1. A rule that does not require suppression of evidence where the 
police have acted objectively reasonably in obtaining and executing a warrant is 
thus consistent with the limited remedial and other purposes of the exclusionary 
rule. The ldaho courts have adopted the same limitations on Idaho's 
exclusionary rule, implicitly recognizing the same balancing of the rule's costs 
against its benefits. 
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law 
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects. LePaae, 102 ldaho at 
391, 630 P.2d at 678. The Leon Court addressed other purposes for the 
exclusionary rule and found them inadequate to justify excluding evidence 
obtained by a police officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in 
obtaining and executing a search warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 921 n.22, 922. 
This authority and reasoning is persuasive, and should guide the ldaho courts in 
application of the exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution. 
2. Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under Idaho's 
Exclusionarv Rule 
Even under the exclusionary rule of Guzman suppression is unwarranted 
in this case. As noted above, the ldaho exclusionary rule serves the purposes of 
providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures, deterring police 
misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant application process, 
preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing consideration of the 
evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 993, 842 P.2d 
at 672. None of these goals is served by suppression in this case. 
First, suppression in this case does not provide a remedy for 
unreasonable searches and seizures. At the time Officer Bammert searched 
Newman's car, the search was reasonable under the existing state of the law. 
m, 142 Idaho at 234, 127 P.3d at 137. Applying the exclusionary rule would 
provide a "remedy" for conduct that was legal and reasonable at the time it 
occurred. The reasonableness of the officer's actions only comes into question 
by applying law that did not even exist until almost two years after the search 
took place. Such application would be a windfall rather than a remedy. 
Second, as mentioned above, application of the exclusionary rule in this 
case cannot conceivably provide any deterrent. Neither police nor anyone else 
can be deterred from failing to follow the guidelines of mt by suppressing the 
1 fruit of searches conducted before Gant was even decided. 
Third, exclusion will not encourage thoroughness in the warrant 
! 
application process because there was no warrant. Nor will suppression 
encourage thoroughness in the decision to search a car incident to arrest 
because officers will certainly be required to follow Gant now that that case has 
I 
been decided. 
Fourth, there would be no "additional constitutional violation" by use of the 
evidence. Idaho's constitution contains no express or implied constitutional right 
to prevent the prosecution from using evidence seized pursuant to a search that 
was legal under the law and precedents existing at the time of the search. 
Finally, application of the exclusionary rule would not preserve judicial 
integrity. Quite the opposite would occur by applying the exclusionary rule in the 
context of this case. As noted by the Supreme Court, application of the 
exclusionary rule imposes substantial societal costs in allowing the guilty to go 
free. &, 468 U.S. at 907. To mandate those costs without any benefit does 
not preserve judicial integrity. Likewise, to punish society because an officer 
failed to anticipate a change in the law that governed his conduct is not an act of 
integrity, but an act without reason. 
In this case the search was reasonable under the law at the time it was 
conducted. To date, the search is still reasonable under applicable authority 
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. If the law is to be changed to retroactively 
render the search unreasonable, then the exclusionary rule does not apply 
because suppression of evidence of a search that was lawful when conducted 
would not meet any underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule. 
E. The Search Of Newman's Car Was Proper Based On The Officers' 
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion That Newman Was Armed Or 
Danaerous 
The district court determined that the search of Newman's car was a valid 
search incident to arrest. (R., pp. 65-66.) Newman asserts on appeal that 
because the search incident to arrest theory was the "sole theory offered by the 
prosecution below to justify the search, and the only one relied on by the District 
Court in its order denying suppression," the recent holding in m, which 
substantially limits the instances in which an officer may lawfully search a 
vehicle incident to arrest, leaves "no doubt" that the search in this case was 
unconstitutional. (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) This reasoning is incorrect. 
The evidence before the district court established that the officers on 
scene had a reasonable basis to believe that Newman was armed or dangerous 
and, as such, the search of Newman's vehicle was valid pursuant to the officer 
safety exception to the warrant requirement. Thus, even if this Court determines 
that the search of Newman's car was not a valid search incident to arrest under 
w, the district court's order denying Newman's motion to suppress must 
nevertheless be affirmed on this alternative basis. See, e.q., McKinnev v. State, 
133 ldaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999); State v. Avelar, 129 ldaho 700, 
704, 931 P.2d 1218, 1222 (1997) (where the lower court reaches the correct 
result by a different theory, the appellate court will affirm the order on the correct 
theory). 
Officer safety is always a legitimate concern during a traffic stop. As the 
Court of Appeals noted: 
Concern for officer safety during routine traffic stops has been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as being "both 
legitimate and weighty." This is because the "possibility of a violent 
encounter stems not from the ordinary reaction of a motorist 
stopped for a speeding violation, but from the fact that evidence of 
a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." 
State v. Johnson, 137 ldaho 656, 661, 51 P.3d 1112 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting 
Pennsvlvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Marvland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 
During a stop based upon reasonable suspicion, an officer may conduct a 
reasonable search for weapons where there is reason to believe that the officer 
is dealing with an armed and dangerous person. "The officer need n o t b e  
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably 
prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety 
or that of others was in danger." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968). An officer 
may also make a cursory search for weapons of the interior of a car under the 
same standards as would justify a Tern/ frisk of an individual. Michiqan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032 (1983); State v. Muir, 116 ldaho 565, 567, 777 P.2d 1238, 1239 
(Ct. App. 1989). Those standards are whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, an officer has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed 
and presently dangerous." Tern/, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. Rawlinas, 121 ldaho 
930, 933, 829 P.2d 520, 523 (1992); State v. Fleenor, 133 ldaho 552, 555, 989 
P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The Court in Lana emphasized that such a 
search may be undertaken even where the suspect is detained outside of the 
vehicle: 
Just as a Terry suspect on the street may, despite being under the 
brief control of a police officer, reach into his clothing and retrieve a 
weapon, so might a Terry suspect in Long's position break away 
from police control and retrieve a weapon from his automobile. In 
addition, if the suspect is not placed under arrest, he will be 
permitted to reenter his automobile, and he will then have access to 
any weapons inside . . . in any event, we stress that a Terry 
investigation, such as the one that occurred here, involves a police 
investigation "at close range," when the officer remains particularly 
vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been 
effected, and the officer must make a "quick decision as to how to 
protect himself and others from possible danger . . .." 
463 U.S. at 1051-52 (citations omitted). The United States Supreme Court in 
Gant noted the continued relevancy of such searches: 
Other established exceptions to the warrant requirement authorize 
a vehicle search under additional circumstances when safety or 
evidentiary concerns demand. For instance, Michigan v. Long 
permits an officer to search a vehicle's passenger compartment 
when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or 
not the arrestee, is "dangerous" and might access the vehicle to 
"gain immediate control of weapons." 
Gant -. - U.S. a t ,  129 S.Ct. at 1721 (citations omitted). 
So long as "an officer can point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences therefrom, reasonably warrant a frisk for 
weapons, then such a frisk will not violate the Fourth Amendment." State v. 
Huahes, 134 Idaho 81 1,813, 10 P.3d 760,762 (Ct. App. 2000). 
In this case, the district court found that: 
Officer Bammert asked [Newman] to exit his vehicle and, while the 
defendant was doing so, Officer Bammert saw the defendant 
putting something back into the vehicle, between the seats. Officer 
Bammert asked the defendant what he put in the vehicle and the 
defendant did not answer. Officer Bammert looked into the vehicle 
and saw that it was a pellet gun, which looked like a real gun. 
Officer Bammert did not initially know that it was not a real gun. 
The officer said that after he found the pellet gun, the defendant 
informed him that it was not a real gun, but a pellet gun. There was 
some disagreement between the officers as to whether the 
defendant told them about the gun, after he was arrested but before 
the search or if it was seen through the window before the arrest 
and the search of the vehicle. Regardless of the minor differences, 
it is clear that for legal purposes, the arrest and discovery of the 
weapon were for all practical purposes contemporaneous. 
(Tr., pp. 55-57.) The arresting officer observed a man wearing a stocking cap on 
a hot summer night, sitting in a non-running vehicle with tinted, rolled up windows 
in city park after hours where he indicated he had been for an hour an a half, 
place something between his seats while exiting the vehicle. (&, generally, Tr., 
p. 9, L. 17 - p. 14, L.l; p. 17, L. 15 - p. 18, L. 5 (testimony of Officer Bammert at 
the suppression hearing describing the circumstances surrounding his initial 
contact with Newman).) 
Based on the totality of the circumstances present in this case, it was 
reasonable for Officer Bammert to determine, as Newman was exiting the vehicle 
upon his directive, that Newman was armed and dangerous, thus justifying a 
search of his vehicle for weapons. The state therefore requests this Court to 
affirm the district court's order on this alternative basis. 
F. The Search Of Newman's Vehicle Was Valid Based On The Existence Of 
Evidence Which Supported A Findinq Of Probable Cause To Believe That 
Evidence Of A Crime Could Be Present In The Vehicle 
There is also sufficient evidence that supports a finding of probable cause 
to believe that evidence of a crime could have been present in Newman's 
vehicle, thus giving rise to an additional ground for this Court to affirm the district 
court's order on an alternative basis. 
The "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement allows the police to 
search a vehicle without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the 
vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime. Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132 (1925); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US. 753, 760 (1979); State v. Buti, 
131 Idaho 793, 964 P.2d 660 (1998); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 
P.2d 1093, 1096 (1981). The extent to which police officers may conduct a 
search under the automobile exception was addressed by the Supreme Court, 
which held: 
[Tlhe scope of the warrantless search authorized by [this] exception 
is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could legitimately 
authorize by warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a 
lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the 
vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. 
United Slates v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982). The scope of a search 
pursuant to the automobile exception may extend to containers found within the 
car. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1991). The analysis of 
whether an officer had probable cause for an automobile search is whether, 
based on the objective facts, a magistrate would have issued a warrant under 
similar circumstances. State v. Murphy, 129 ldaho 861, 864, 934 P.2d 34, 37 
(Ct. App. 1997); State v. She~herd, 118 Idaho 121, 123, 795 P.2d 15, 17 (Ct. 
App. 1990). Determining the existence of probable cause is "a practical, 
common sense decision whether, given ail the circumstances ..., there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found ...." Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Probable cause does not require an actual 
showing of criminal activity, but only the "probability or substantial chance" of 
such activity. Id. at 244-45 n.13. A practical, nontechnical probability that 
incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required. Texas v. Brown, 460 
U.S. 730, 742 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). The 
facts known to the officers must be judged in accordance with "the factual and 
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
The decision in Gant maintains the importance of this exception to the warrant 
requirement: "If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of 
criminal activity, United States v. Ross authorizes a search of any area of the 
vehicle in which the evidence might be found." - U.S. at -, 129 S.Ct. at 
1721 (citation omitted). 
Here, the district court found that officers responded to the city park after 
dark subsequent to making contact with a woman who indicated she had been 
directed to the park via email from an individual claiming to have left a free lpod 
in a port-a-potty. (R., p. 55.) Officers did not find an lpod at the park, but did find 
Newman wearing a stocking cap on a hot July night and sitting in a parked 
vehicle with rolled-up, tinted windows in close proximity to a port-a-potty. (R., pp. 
54-56.) Newman indicated he had been working on his computer in his car, in 
the park, in the dark, for the past hour and a half. (R., pp. 55-56.) The officer 
observed a computer and a pair of ski gloves in plain view in Newman's vehicle. 
(R., p. 56.) As Newman exited his vehicle, he placed between the seats an 
object that appeared to the officers to be a gun. (R., p. 56.) 
It is a reasonable inference that a man who is sitting in a hot car with 
windows dark enough to prevent passersby from readily observing what is inside 
while wearing a cap and ski gloves in the summer and waiting for someone to 
respond to a false claim of a free lpod may have evidence of a crime in his 
vehicle. The district court's findings support a practical, common sense 
determination that, given all the circumstances surrounding law enforcement's 
interaction with Newman, there was a fair probability that contraband or evidence 
of a crime would be found in his vehicle. As such, the state requests that this 
Court affirm the district court's order denying suppression of evidence on this 
alternative basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying the motion for suppression of evidence. 
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